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I. THE EVOLUTION OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
Crimes against humanity are directed against any civilian po¡mlation and
are forbidden either in time of peace or of armed conflict. Their legal 
definition has its origins in the Charter of the Intemational Military 
Tribunal of Nuremberg. According to Article 6( e) of the Charter, as 
amended by the Protocol of 6 October 1945, crimes against humanity 
were 
namely murder, extennination, enslavement, deportation, and other 
inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or 
during the war, or persecutions on political, racial or religious 
grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the 
domestic law ofthe country where perpetrated.
2 
The subsequent evolution of intemational law implied a radical 
change in the definition of crimes against humanity, with the gradual 
disappearance of the requirement of the act being committed during the 
war or in connection with any crime against peace or war crime. Several 
intemational treatie recognized the autonomy of crimes against 
humanity. The 1948 Convention on the prevention and punishment ofthe 
crime of genocide deserves a special mention. Although the crime of 
genocide was until then considered as the second category of crimes 
against humanity, this Convention no longer requires it being committed 
during an armed conflict. 
Nor the subsequent evolution of the definition on the first 
category of crimes against humanity contained any substantive link with 
other crimes relating to a state of war. The first step in this direction was 
taken by the Control Council established by the four victorious Powers in 
* This essay has been written in the framework of the Research Project SEJ2007-
65135/JURI. 
1 Report of the Secretary-General on the Statute of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (S/25704), para. 47. 
2 Roger S. Clark and Iuri A. Reshetov, 'Crimes against Humanity' in G.
Ginsburgs and V. N. Kudriavtsev (eds.), The Nuremberg Tria! and International Law 
(Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1990), pp. 180-192. 
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order to administer Germany after World War II. The Control Council 
passed Law No. 10 for the Punishment of Persons Guilty ofWar Crimes, 
Crimes against Peace and against Humanity. It defined "crimes against 
humanity" as an open list of "atrocities and offences ... whether or not in 
violation of the domestic laws of the country where perpetrated". 3 This 
trend was consolidated by the 1968 Convention on the Non-Applicability 
of Statutory Limitations to W ar Crimes and Crimes against Humanity 
and bl national case-law, mainly the Eichmann, Barbie and Touvier
cases. 
This trend was consecrated at the international level by the case­
law of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). 
Although the ICTY Statute5 keeps on declaring that this Tribunal has 
jurisdiction "to prosecute persons responsible for [ crimes against 
humanity] when committed in armed conflict, whether international or 
interna! in character ... ", the ICTY Appeals Chamber has concluded that 
"customary international law no longer requires any nexus between 
crimes against humanity and armed conflict, while Article 5 was 
intended to reintroduce this nexus only for the purposes of this 
Tribunal". 6 
The last step forward was represented by Article 3 of the ICTR 
Statute.7 On this occasion, the Security Council not only dissociated 
crimes against humanity from crimes against peace or war crimes, it also 
replaced the requirement of these crimes being "committed in armed 
conflict, whether international or interna! in character" with the exigency 
of these crimes being "committed as part of a widespread or systematic 
attack against any civilian population". 8 This provision has influenced 
3 In the Einsatzgruppen Case, 8-9 February 1948, Judgment, the Military
Tribunal held that: "The Intemational Military Tribunal, operating under the [Nuremberg] 
Charter, declared that the Charter's provisions limited the Tribunal to consider only those 
crimes against humanity which were committed in execution of or in connection with 
crimes against peace and war crimes. The Allied Control Council, in its Law No. 10, 
removed this limitation so that the present Tribunal has jurisdiction to try all crimes 
against humanity as long known and understood under the general principles of criminal 
law", pp. 113-114. 
4 All relevant national and intemational instruments and judgments on crimes
against humanity are available at www.icc-cpi.int/legaltools, 29 May 2009. 
5 SC Res. 827 (1993), 25 May 1993, established the ICTY.
6 ICTY, Decision of 2 October 2005 on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory 
Appeal on Jurisdiction on the Tadic Case, paras. 78, 140--141. 
7 SC Res. 955 (1994), 8 November 1994, established the ICTR.
8 It must be noted that this provision goes on saying "on national, political, ethnic,
racial or religious grounds". However, as the ICTR held in its Kajelijeli case, 1 December 
2003, Trial Judgment, para. 877: "This provision is jurisdictional in nature, limiting the 
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN lNTERNATIONAL LA W 549 
the drafting of both the 1998 Statute of the Intemational Criminal Court
(ICC), and the different Statutes establishing intemationalized tribunals.9 
II. THE GENERAL ELEMENTS OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
The general elements, common to all crimes against humanity, are 
described in the heading of Article 7(1) of the ICC Statute, as "acts ... 
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against
any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack" . 10 
A. The Context Elements
The concefit of 'attack' has been widely discussed both by the ICTY and
the ICTR. 1 According to the ICTY, an "attack is a course of conduct
involving the commission of acts of violence".12 These acts of violence
are not necessarily limited to the use of armed force, as the ICTY has 
made clear that the concepts of 'attack' and 'armed conflict' are 
different. The attack can be a part of an armed conflict, but this is not
always required.13 However, the ICTR has followed a broader
jurisdiction of the Tribunal to a narrower category of crimes, and not intended to alter the 
definition of crimes against humanity in intemational law". See also Akayesu case, 1 June 
2001, ICTR, Appeal Judgment, paras. 464-466. 
9 Regulation No. 2000/15, 6 June 2000, On the establishment of Panels with
exclusive jurisdiction over serious criminal offences in East Timor, Section 5; Statute of 
the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Article 2; Agreement between the United Nations and 
the Royal Govemment of Cambodia establishing the Extraordinary Chambers conceming 
the Prosecution under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed during the Period of 
Democratic Kampuchea, Article 9. 
1° For each of the 16 particular crimes against humanity specified in the Elements 
of Crimes, the last two elements are: "a) The conduct was committed as part of a 
widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population; b) The perpetrator 
knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part of a widespread or 
systematic attack against a civilian population." ICC, Elements of Crimes, adopted by the 
Assembly of State Parties, first session, New York, 3-10 September 2002 (Official 
Records ICC-ASP/1/3), pp. 116-124. 
11 Although Article 5 of the ICTY Statute does not provide for this requirement, 
the ICTY has considered it as a necessary requirement for the establishment of a crime 
against humanity. See Kunarac et al., 22 February 2001, Trial Judgment, para. 410. On 
the other hand, the existence of an 'attack' is expressly required by Article 3 of the ICTR 
Statute. 
12 Naletilic and Martinovic, 31 March 2003, ICTY, Trial Judgment, para. 233.
13 Vasiljevic, 29 November 2002, ICTY, Trial Judgment, paras. 29-30. In 
Kunarac et al., 12 June 2002, Appeal Judgment, para. 86, the ICTY declared that: "The 
concepts of 'attack' and 'armed conflict' are not identical. As the Appeals Chamber has 
already noted when comparing the content of customary intemational law to the 
Tribunal's Statute, "the two - the 'attack on the civilian population' and the 'armed 
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interpretation, being sufficient to exert pressure on the civil population
when the widespread or systematic requirements are fulfilled. 1 
The ICC Statute has adopted a restrictive interpretation of the 
term 'attack' . 15 Pursuant to its Article 7(2)(a), this restrictive 
interpretation requires the existence of a course of conduct but, due to the 
influence of the ICTR case-law, it substitutes the reference to the 
'commission of acts of violence' by the term 'multiple commission of 
acts referred to in paragraph 1 '. This interpretation adds, as a new 
requirement, that these 'acts' must be committed "pursuant to or in 
furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack". 16
Although this last requirement was introduced by the 
Intemational Law Commission (ILC) in its 1996 Draft Code, 17 the ICTY 
Appeals Chamber concluded that there is nothing in customary 
intemational law which requires proof of the existence of a plan or 
policy to commit these crimes. 18 Despite sorne initial contradictions, 19 
conflict' - must be separate notions, although of course under Article 5 of the Statute the 
attack on 'any civilian population' may be part of an 'armed conflict"'. Under customary 
intemational law, the attack could precede, outlast, or continue during the armed conflict, 
but it need not be part of it. Also, the attack in the context of a crime against humanity is 
not limited to the use of armed force; it encompasses any mistreatment of the civilian 
population". 
14 Akayesu, 2 September 1998, ICTR, Trial Judgment, para. 581 defined an attack
"as an unlawful act ofthe kind enumerated in Article 3(a) to (i) of the Statute, like murder, 
extermination, enslavement etc. An attack may also be non violent in nature, like 
imposing a system of apartheid . . . or exerting pressure on the population to act in a 
particular manner, may come under the purview of an attack, if orchestrated on a massive 
scale or in a systematic manner". 
15 María Torres, La responsabilidad internacional del individuo por la comisión
de crímenes de lesa humanidad (Tirant, Valencia, 2008), pp. 112-128. 
16 
"A policy which has a civilian population as the object of the attack would be 
implemented by State or organizational action. Such a policy may, in exceptional 
circumstances, be implemented by a deliberate failure to take action, which is consciously 
aimed at encouraging such attack. The existence of such a policy cannot be inferred solely 
from the absence of governmental or organizational action." Elements of Crimes, supra 
note 10, p. 116, para. 3. On the possibility of committing a crime by lack of action, see 
Darryl Robinson, 'The Elements of Crimes against Humanity' in R. S. Lee, (ed.), The 
International Criminal Court. Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
(Transnational Publishers, Ardsley, 2001), pp. 74-76. 
17 
Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly on the 
work ofits forty-eight session (1996) II Yearbook ofthe ILC, part 2, p. 47, para. 5. 
18 In its Kunarac et al., Appeal Judgment, para. 98, the ICTY held that: "neither 
the attack nor the acts of the accused needs to be supported by any form of 'policy' or 
'plan'. There was nothing in the Statute or in customary intemational law at the time of 
the alleged acts which required proof of the existence of a plan or policy to commit these 
crimes. As indicated above, proof that the attack was directed against a civilian population 
and that it was widespread or systematic, are legal elements of the crime. But to prove 
these elements, it is not necessary to show that they were the result of the existence of a 
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the ICTR subsequently adopted the ICTY case-law, arguing "that the 
existence of a policy or plan may be evidentially relevant, in that it may 
be useful in establishing that the attack was directed against a civilian 
population and that it was widespread or systematic, but the existence of 
such a plan is not a separate legal element of the crime". 
20 
Nonetheless, the ICC Statute requires the proof of this element, 
considering that the promotion or encouragement by a State or 
organization of an attack against a civilian population is an essential 
element, aimed at distinguishing crimes against humanity from crisis 
situations where the same material acts can take place, but without the 
seriousness required to fulfil this qualification. 
The attack must be either widespread or systematic in nature. 
Neither the Nuremberg Charter nor the ICTY Statute included this 
requirement.
2 1 
However, the ILC Draft Code
22 
and the ICTR Statute laid
it down. As the ICTR has underlined, customary intemational law 
requires that the attack be of a widespread or systematic nature and need 
not be both. 
23 
However, at the Rome Conference many national 
policy or plan ... Thus, the existence of a policy or plan may be evidentially relevant, but 
it is not a legal element of the crime." See also: Naletilic and Martinovic, Trial Judgment, 
para. 234; Kordic and Cerkez, 26 February 2001, ICTY, Trial Judgment, para. 182; 
Krnojelac, 15 March 2002, ICTY, Trial Judgment, para. 58; Vasiljevic, 29 November 
2002, ICTY, Trial Judgment, para. 36. 
19 Sorne of the first ICTR pronouncements asserted the need of a State policy as a 
requirement for the existence of a crime against humanity. See far instance, Kayishema 
and Ruzindana, 21 May 1999, Trial Judgment, para. 124. 
20 
Semanza, 15 May 2003, ICTR, Trial Judgment, para. 329. This idea was ratified 
by Semanza, 20 May 2005, Appeal Judgment, para. 269. 
21 In Blaskic, 3 March 2000, Trial Judgment, para. 202, the ICTY held that: "the
'widespread or systematic' character of the offence does not feature in the provisions of 
Article 5 ofthe Statute which mention only acts 'directed against any civilian population'. 
lt is appropriate, however, to note that the words 'directed against any civilian population' 
and sorne of the sub-characterisations set out in the text of the Statute imply, both by their 
nature and by law, an element of being widespread or organised, whether as regards the 
acts or the victims." 
22 
Report ofthe ILC, supra note 17, p. 47, paras. 3-4. 
23 
In Rutaganda, 6 December 1999, Trial Judgment, paras. 67-68, the ICTR held 
that: "with regard to the nature of this attack, the Chamber notes that Article 3 of the 
English version of the Sta tute reads 'as part of a widespread or systematic attack' whilst 
the French version of the Statute reads « dans le cadre d'une attaque généralisée et 
systématique ». The French version requires that the attack be both of a widespread and 
systematic nature, whilst the English version requires that the attack be of a widespread or 
systematic nature and need not be both. The Chamber notes that customary intemational 
law requires that the attack be either widespread or systematic nature and need not be 
both. The English version of the Statute conforms more closely with customary 
intemational law and the Chamber therefore accepts the elements as set forth in Article 3 
of the English version of the Statute and follows the interpretation in other ICTR 
judgments namely: that the 'attack' under Article 3 of the Sta tute, must be either of a 
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delegations supported the requirement of both characteristics, arguing 
that this is the main reason for distinguishing crimes against humanity 
from other similar common offences that are not sufficiently serious to 
be subjected to the ICC jurisdiction. Finally, the arrangement reached 
maintained this requirement in the altemative, given that the required 
existence of an "attack" as "a course of conduct involving the multiple 
commission of acts . . . pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or 
organizational policy to commit such attack" ensured the reticent States a 
broader restriction on the concept of crimes against humanity. 
The ICTR has considered that the concept of 'widespread' may 
be defmed as massive, frequent, large scale action, carried out 
collectively with considerable seriousness and directed against a 
multiplicity of victims. The concept of 'systematic' may be defined as 
thoroughly organised and following a regular pattem on the basis of a 
common policy involving substantial public or private resources.24
F actors to consider in determining whether an attack satisfies either or 
both requirements of a widespread or systematic attack are enumerated 
in the ICTY jurisprudence, and include (i) the consequences of the attack 
upon the targeted population, (ii) the number of victims, (iii) the nature 
of the acts, and (iv) the possible participation of officials or authorities or 
any identifiable pattems of crimes.
25 
Taking into account both that the attack requires a "multiple 
commission of acts" and that it must be "a widespread or systematic 
attack" there have been doubts whether a single act can qualify as a 
crime against humanity. It must be noted that it is the attack, and not the 
single act, which must be widespread or systematic. The ICTY has held 
that as long as there is a link with the widespread or systematic attack 
against a civilian population, a single act could qualify as a crime against 
humanity. As such, an individual committing a crime against a single 
victim or a limited number of victims might be recognized as guilty of a 
crime against humanity if his acts were part of the specific context of 
crimes against humanity.
26 
A different question is the convenience of 
prosecuting this individual before the ICC, as its jurisdiction has been 
limited "to the most serious crimes of concem to the intemational 
community as a whole" (Article 5), bearing in mind that in other cases 
widespread or systematic nature and need not be both." 
24 Akayesu, Trial Judgment, supra note 14, para. 580. 
25 Staldc, 31 July 2003, Trial Judgment, para. 625. See also Blasldc, 3 March 
2000, Trial Judgment, paras. 203-204; Jelisic, 14 December 1999, Trial Judgment, para. 
53; Kunarac et al., Appeal Judgment, para. 95. 
26 
Review of the Indictment Pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence in the Mrksic, Radie, and Sljivancanin case, 3 April 1996, para. 30. 
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the domestic tribunals have jurisdiction by virtue of the complementarity 
principle.27 
The attack must be "directed against any civilian population". 
Neither the ICC Statute nor its Elements of Crimes define the concept of 
'civilian population' for the purposes of crimes against humanity. This 
requirement has been interpreted by the ICTY and the ICTR, taking into 
account different intemational humanitarian law treaties. According to 
these Tribunals, the requirement that the civilian population be the main 
airo of the attack, reaffinns the collective character of crimes against 
humanity, with the exclusion of single or isolated acts.28 However, the 
use of the tenn 'population' <loes not mean that the entire population of 
the geographical entity in which the attack is taking place must have 
been subj ected to that attack. It is sufficient to show that enough 
individuals were targeted in the course of the attack, or that they were 
targeted in such a way as to satisfy these Tribunals that the attack was in 
fact directed against a civilian population, rather than against a limited 
and randomly selected number of individuals.29
Intemational humanitarian law defines 'civilian population' in a 
negative way, embracing all persons who are not combatants.30 But as 
the ICTY and the ICTR have declared, crimes against humanity may be 
committed either in peace time or during an anned conflict, whether 
national or intemational.31 Therefore, the tenn 'civilian' must be 
27 The ICTY has already followed this practice. See Decision for referral to the 
authorities of the Republic of Croatia pursuant to Rule 11 bis in the Ademi and Norac case, 
14 September 2005; Decision of the Appeals Chamber on Rule l l bis Referral in the 
Jankovic case, 11 November 2005. 
28 Tadic, 7 May 1997, ICTY, Trial Judgment, para. 644. 
29 For the ICTY, see Kunarac et al., Appeal Judgment, para. 90; Simic et al., Trial
Judgment of 17 October 2003, para. 42. For the ICTR, Bagilishema, 7 June 2001, Trial 
Judgment, para. 80. In Brdjanin, 1 September 2004, Trial Judgment, para. 134, the ICTY 
added: "in order to determine whether the attack may be said to have been directed against 
a civilian population, the means and methods used in the course of the attack may be 
examined, the number and status of the victims, the nature of the crimes committed in its 
course, the resistance to the assailants at the time and the extent to which the attacking 
force may be said to have complied or attempted to comply with the precautionary 
requirements ofthe laws ofwar". 
30 United Nations War Crime Commission, History of the United Nations War 
Crimes Commission and the Development of Laws of War (H.M.S.O., London, 1948), p. 
193. See Article 4 of the Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War (Geneva, 12 August 1949) and Article 50 of Protocol I Additional to the
Geneva Conventions relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Con:flicts (8 June 1977).
31 Pursuant to Egon Schwelb, 'Crimes against Humanity' (1946) 22 British
Yearbook of International Law p. 191, during the first trials concerning crimes against 
humanity after World War II, the commission of these crimes against members of the 
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understood within the context of war as well as relative peace. These 
Tribunals consider that a wide definition of 'civilian' is applicable and, 
in the context of a situation where there is no armed conflict, includes all 
persons except those who have the duty to maintain public order and 
have the legitimate means to exercise force.32 In all cases, the fact that 
there are certain individuals among the civilian population who are not 
civilians <loes not deprive the population of its civilian character,33
provided that these are not regular units with fairly large numbers of 
soldiers.34 Hence, for the ICTR: 
Members of the civilian population are people who are not taking 
active part in the hostilities, including members of the armed forces 
who laid down their arms and those persons placed hors de combat
by sickness, wounds, detention or any other cause. Where there are 
certain individuals within the civilian population who do not come 
within the definition of civilians, this <loes not deprive the population 
of its civilian character. 35 
B. The Subjective Element
The Elements of Crimes have identified as the second common element 
to all crimes against humanity that "the perpetrator knew that the conduct 
was part of or intended to be part of a widespread or systematic attack 
against a civilian population". This mens rea comprises three elements: 
"(i) the intent to commit the underlying offence or offences with which 
he is charged; (ii) the knowledge that there is an attack against the 
civilian population; and (iii) the knowledge that his acts comprise part of 
that attack". 
36 
According to Article 30(3) of the ICC Statute, the term 'with 
knowledge of the attack' means "awareness that a circumstance exists", 
that is, the perpetrator must be aware of the existence of a widespread or 
armed forces was accepted only when the author and the victim of the crime had the same 
nationality. 
32 Kayishema and Ruzindana, 21 May 1999, ICTR, Trial Judgment, para. 127. 
33 
For the ICTR, see Rutaganda, Trial Judgment, para. 72; Kayishema and 
Ruzindana, Trial Judgment, para. 127-129; Musema, 27 January 2000, Trial Judgment, 
para. 207. For the ICTY, see Jelisie, Trial Judgment, para. 54; Kupreslde et al., 14 January 
2000, Trial Judgment, paras. 547-549; Kordie and Cerkez, Trial Judgment, para. 180; 
Naletilie and Martinovie, Trial Judgment, para. 235. 
34 Bias/de, 29 July 2004, Appeal Judgment, para. 115; Brdjanin, Trial Judgment, 
para. 134. 
35 Akayesu, Trial Judgment, para. 582. For the ICTY, see Bias/de, Trial Judgment, 
para. 214. 
36 Blagojevie and Jo/de, 17 January 2005, Trial Judgment, para. 548. 
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systematic attack against a civilian population as the general context of 
his acts. The ICTY Appeals Chamber has concreted this requirement: 
Conceming the required mens rea for crimes against humanity, the 
Trial Chamber correctly held that the accused must have had the 
intent to commit the underlying offence or offences with which he is 
charged, and that he must have known "that there is an attack on the 
civilian population and that his acts comprise part of that attack, or at 
least [ that he took] the risk that his acts were part of the attack". This 
requirement, as pointed out by the Trial Chamber, <loes not entail 
knowledge of the details of the attack. 
F or criminal liability pursuant to Article 5 of the Sta tute, "the 
motives of the accused for taking part in the attack are irrelevant and 
a crime against humanity may be committed for purely personal 
reasons". Furthermore, the accused need not share the purpose or 
goal behind the attack. It is also irrelevant whether the accused 
intended his acts to be directed against the targeted population or 
merely against his victim. It is the attack, not the acts of the accused, 
which must be directed against the target population and the accused 
need only know that his acts are part thereof. At most, evidence that 
he committed the acts for purely personal reasons could be indicative 
of a rebuttable assumption that he was not aware that his acts were 
part of that attack.37 
According to the Elements of Crimes, "existence of intent and 
knowledge can be inferred from relevant facts and circumstances".
38 
Hence, the mens rea may be inferred from a concurrence of concrete 
facts, such as the historical and political circumstances in which the acts 
occurred, the functions of the accused when the crimes were committed, 
his responsibilities within the political or military hierarchy, the scope 
and gravity of the acts perpetrated, the nature of the crimes committed 
and the degree to which they were common knowledge or other similar 
facts and circumstances.
39 
The ICTR has added that: 
Part of what transforms an individual's act(s) into a crime against 
humanity is the inclusion of the act within a greater dimension of 
37 Kunarac et al., Appeal Judgment, paras. 102-103. See also: Tadic, 15 July
1999, Appeal Judgment, paras. 270-272; Kordic and Cerkez, Trial Judgment, paras. 185-
187. Even the Elements of Crimes has settled down that this element "should not be
interpreted as requiring proof that the perpetrator had knowledge of all characteristics of
the attack or the precise details of the plan or policy of the State or organization". See
supra note 10, p. 116, para. 2.
38 
!bid., p. 112, para. 3.
39 
Blaskic, Trial Judgment, para. 259; Kordic and Cerkez, Trial Judgment, para.
183.
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criminal conduct; therefore an accused should be aware of this 
greater dimension in order to be culpable thereof. Accordingly, 
actual or constructive knowledge of the broader context of the attack, 
meaning that the accused must know that his act(s) is part of a 
widespread or systematic attack on the civilian population and 
pursuant to sorne kind of policy or plan, is necessary to satisfy the 
requisite mens rea element of the accused. 40 
III. THE SPECIFIC ELEMENTS OF THE DIFFERENT CRIMES AGANST
HUMANITY 
l .  Murder
Article 7(1)(a) of the ICC Statute contains a very brief description ofthe 
first crime against humanity, 'murder'. Moreover, the Elements of 
Crimes <loes not provide for much guidance in this case, as the only 
specific element of this crime is limited to state that "the perpetrator 
killed41 one or more persons".42 There was a significant linguistic 
problem with the authentic versions of the ICTY and ICTR Statutes, as 
the English version refers to 'murder', whilst the French version refers to 
'assassinat' .43 These terms imply differences not only affecting the mens 
rea required, but also on the existence of a premeditation element. 
At first, sorne Chambers of both Tribunals held that customary 
international law dictates that it is the act of 'murder"' that constitutes a 
crime against humanity and not 'assassinat'. Accordingly, they defined 
murder as "the unlawful, intentional killing of a human being". The 
specific mens rea was that "at the time of the killing the accused or a 
subordinate had the intention to kill or inflict grievous bodily harm on 
the deceased having known that such bodily harm is likely to cause the 
victim's death, and is reckless whether death ensues or not".44 
Other Chambers supported the French version. General 
international rules ("as a matter of interpretation, the intention of the 
drafters should be followed so far as possible and a statute should be 
4
° Kayishema and Ruzindana, Trial Judgment, para. 134.
41 "The term 'killed' is interchangeable with the term 'caused death'." 
42 Elements ofCrimes, supra note 10, p. 116. 
43 Even in the authentic Spanish texts, the term 'asesinato' is used in the ICTY 
Statute, while the ICTR uses the term 'homicidio intencional'. María Torres and Valentín 
Bou, La contribución del Tribunal Internacional Penal para Ruanda a la configuración 
jurfdica de los crfmenes internacionales (Tirant,Valencia, 2004), pp. 387-391. 
44 For the ICTR see Akayesu, Trial Judgment, paras. 588-589; Rutaganda, Trial 
Judgment, paras. 80-81; Musema, Trial Judgment, para. 214. For the ICTY see Jelisic, 
Trial Judgment, para. 51; Blaskic, Trial Judgment, para. 216; Kordic and Cerkez, Trial 
Judgment, para. 253. 
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given its plain meaning . . . Indeed, by using 'assassinat' in French, the 
drafters may have intended that only the higher standards of mens rea for 
'murder' will suffice") and criminal law ("if in doubt, a matter of 
interpretation should be decided in favour of the accused; in this case, the 
inclusion of premeditation is favourable to the accused") led to the 
finding that, when 'murder' is considered along with 'assassinat', the 
standard of mens rea required is intentional and premeditated killing. 
The result is premeditated when the actor formulated his intent to kill 
after a cool moment of reflection.45
held: 
This controversy was set down in Semanza, where the ICTR 
It is premeditated murder ( assassinat) that constitutes a crime against 
humanity in Article 3(a) of the Statute. Premeditation requires that, 
at a minimum, the accused held a deliberate plan to kill prior to the 
act causing death, rather than forming the intention simultaneously 
with the act ... The Chamber observes that the requirement that the 
accused must have known that his acts formed part of a wider attack 
on the civilian population generally suggests that the murder was 
pre-planned. The Chamber emphasises that the accused need not 
have premeditated the murder of a particular individua1;46 for crimes 
against humanity it is sufficient that the accused had a premeditated 
intention to murder civilians as part of the widespread or systematic 
attack on discriminatory grounds.47 
The ICC Statute has lost the opportunity to settle with these 
linguistic differences, as its English version refers to 'murder', the 
French to 'meurtre', and the Spanish to 'asesinato'. 
2. Extermination
The ICC Statute has codified the traditional crime against humanity of 
extermination, introducing, as an innovation, that '"extermination' 
includes the intentional infliction of conditions of life, inter alia the 
deprivation of access to food and medicine, calculated to bring about the 
destruction of part of a population" (Article 7(2)(b )). 
Extermination is a crime which by its very nature is directed 
against a group of individuals. Extermination differs from murder in that 
45 For the ICTR see Kayishema and Ruzindana, Trial Judgment, paras. 138-140; 
Bagilishema, Trial Judgment, para. 84. For the ICTY see Kupresldc et al., Trial Judgment, 
paras. 560-561. 
46 On this particular point, see for the ICTY see Kupresldc et al., Trial Judgment,
para, 562; Brdjanin, Trial Judgment, para. 386. 
47 
Semanza, Trial Judgment, para. 339. For the ICTY see Krnojelac, Trial 
Judgment, para. 326. 
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it requires an element of mass destruction. In its first Judgment, the 
ICTR identified two specific essential elements of extermination: (i) the 
accused or his subordinates participated in the killing of certain named or 
described persons; and (ii) the act or omission was unlawful and 
intentional. 
48
These elements have caused two problems. The first problem is 
whether extermination encompasses intentional and unintentional killing, 
as was held by Professor Bassiouni.49 The ICTR followed this opinion on 
several occasions,50 but in Semanza it was of the view "that, in the 
absence of express authority in the Statute or in customary intemational 
law, intemational criminal liability should be ascribed only on the basis 
of intentional conduct".51 The ICTY shared this opinion.
52 
Later on, the
ICTY elaborated further the elements of the crime of 'extermination' as 
follows: 
1. The material element of extennination consists of any one act or
combination of acts which contributes to the killings of a large
number of individuals (actus reus).
2. The offender must intent to kill, to inflict grievous bodily harm, or 
to inflict serious injury, in the reasonable knowledge that such act or
omission is likely to cause death or otherwise intends to participate
in the elimination of a number of individuals, in the knowledge that
his action is part of a vast murderous enterprise in which a large
number of individuals are systematically marked for killing or killed
(mens rea).53 
48 Akayesu, Trial Judgment, para. 591-592. See also Kayishema and Ruzindana, 
Trial Judgment, para. 142; Rutaganda, Trial Judgment, para. 82; Musema, Trial Judgment, 
para. 217; Bagilishema Trial Judgment, para.86; Elizaphan and Gérard Ntaldrutimana 
Trial Judgment of 21 February 2003, para.813; Niyitegeka Trial Judgment of 16 May 
2003, para.450; Semanza, Trial Judgment, para. 340. 
49 "The reason for the latter is that mass killing of a group of people involves 
planning and implementation by a number of persons who, though knowing and wanting 
the intended result, may not necessarily know their victims. Furthermore, such persons 
may not perform the actus reus that produced the deaths, nor have specific intent toward a 
particular victim." M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity in International 
Criminal Law, 2
nd 
ed. (Kluwer Law Intemational, The Hague, 1999), p. 302.
5
° Kayishema and Ruzindana, Trial Judgment, para. 146; Bagilishema, Trial 
Judgment, para. 90. 
51 
Semanza, Trial Judgment, para. 341. See also Akayesu, Trial Judgment, paras. 
591-592; Rutaganda, Trial Judgment, paras. 83-84; Musema, Trial Judgment, para. 218;
Elizaphan and Gérard Ntakirutimana, Trial Judgment, paras. 812-813; Niyitegeka, Trial
Judgment, para. 450.
52 Krstic, 2 August 2001, Trial Judgment, paras. 490-503. 
53 
Vasiljevic, Trial Judgment, para. 229. 
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The second problem concerns the number of victims needed for 
the crime to be deemed 'extermination'. This is a rather complex 
problem and these Tribunals have never fixed a particular number of 
victims needed.54 The opinion that has finally prevailed is: 
An actor may be guilty of extennination if he kills, or creates the 
conditions of life that kills, a single person providing the actor is 
aware that his act( s) or omission( s) forms part of a mass killing 
event. F or a single killing to form part of extennination, the killing 
must actually form part of a mass killing event. An 'event' exists 
when the mass killings have close proximity in time and place".55 
These opinions have been reflected in the Elements of Crimes. 
3. Enslavement
Pursuant to the ILC, "enslavement means establishing or maintaining 
over persons a status of slavery, servitude or forced labour contrary to 
well-established and widely recognized standards of international law".56 
However, these norms <lid not include any stipulation on the individual 
criminal responsibility for enslavement practices until the end of World 
War II.57 
The ICC Statute includes 'enslavement' among the crimes 
against humanity. Enslavement means "the exercise of any or all of the 
powers attaching to the right of ownership over a person and includes the 
exercise of such power in the course of trafficking in persons, in 
particular women and children" (Article 7(2)(c)). Neither this definition, 
nor the Elements of Crimes have been innovators on this topic, as they 
closely follow Article 1 of the 1926 Slavery Convention. 
Only the ICTY has provided for sorne guidance on the definition 
of enslavement in contemporary international law: 
Enslavement as a crime against humanity in customary intemational 
law consisted of the exercise of any or all the powers attaching to the 
right of ownership over a person ... The actus reus of the violation is 
the exercise of any or all the powers attaching to the right of 
ownership over a person. The mens rea of the violation consists in 
the intentional exercise of such powers . . . Under this definition, 
54 For the ICTY, see Krstic, Trial Judgment, para. 501. For the ICTR, see 
Nahimana, Barayagwiza and Ngeze, 3 December 2003, Trial Judgment, para. 1061. 
55 Kayishema and Ruzindana, Trial Judgment, para. 147. 
56 Report ofthe ILC, supra note 17, p. 48, para. 10. 
57 See the Nuremberg Judgment conceming Van Schirach. Applying Control 
Council Law No. 10, see also the Judgment of 16 April 1947 in The United States of 
America v. Erhard Milch and the Judgment of 3 November 1947 in The United States of 
America v. Oswald Pohl et al. 
560 Valentín Bou 
indications of enslavement include elements of control and 
ownership; the restriction or control of an individual's autonomy, 
freedom of choice or freedom of movement; and, often, the accruing 
of sorne gain to the perpetrator. The consent or free will ofthe victim 
is absent. It is often rendered impossible or irrelevant by, for 
example, the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion; the 
fear of violence, deception or captivity, psychological oppression or 
socio-economic conditions. Further indications of enslavement 
include exploitation; the exaction of forced or compulsory labour or 
service, often without remuneration and often, though not 
necessarily, involving physical hardship; sex; prostitution; and 
human trafficking ... The 'acquisition' or 'disposal' of someone for 
monetary or other compensation, is not a requirement for 
enslavement. Doing so, however, is a prime example of the exercise 
of the right of ownership over someone. The duration of the 
suspected exercise of powers attaching to the right of ownership is 
another factor that may be considered when determining whether 
someone was enslaved; however, its importance in any given case 
will depend on the existence of other indications of enslavement. 
Detaining or keeping someone in captivity, without more, would, 
depending on the circumstances of a case, usually not constitute 
enslavement . . . The factors . . . to be taken into consideration in 
determining whether enslavement was committed ... are the control 
of someone's movement, control of physical environment, 
psychological control, measures taken to prevent or deter escape, 
force, threat of force or coercion, duration, assertion of exclusivity, 
subjection to cruel treatment and abuse, control of sexuality and 
forced labour. The Prosecutor also submitted that the mere ability to 
huy, sell, trade or inherit a person or his or her labours or services 
could be a relevant factor. The Trial Chamber considers that the 
mere ability to do so is insufficient, such actions actually occurring 
could be a relevant factor.58 
4. Deportation or Forcible Transfer of Population
The ICC Statute lays down the traditional crime against humanity of 
deportation. However, as an innovation, it also introduces the crime of 
forcible transfer of population. The ICTY had considered this last 
conduct as included among those constituting 'other inhumane acts'. 
59 In 
its opinion, both deportation and forcible transfer relate to the 
involuntary and unlawful evacuation of individuals from the territory in 
which they reside. Y et, the two are not synonymous in customary 
58 Kunarac et al., Trial Judgment, paras. 539-542; Kunarac et al., Appeal 
Judgment, paras. 117-121. 
59 Sta/de, Trial Judgment, para. 723; Brdjanin, Trial Judgment, para. 544. 
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intemational law. Deportation presumes transfer beyond State borders, 
whereas forcible transfer relates to displacements within a State.60 
Hence, deportation means "the forced displacement of persons by 
expulsion or other coercive acts from the area in which they are lawfully 
present, without grounds permitted under intemational law. Deportation 
requires the displacement of persons across a national border", 61 whereas 
forcible transfer is "the forced removal or displacement of people from 
one area to another which may take place within the same national 
borders" .62
Conceming the actus reus of both crimes, the ICTY has 
identified the following common elements, that are needed to ascertain 
that an act of deportation or forcible transfer has occurred: "(i) the 
unlawful character of the displacement;63 (ii) the area where the person 
displaced lawfully resided and the destination to which the person was 
displaced; and (iii) the intent of the perpetrator to deport or forcibly64 
transfer the victim". 65
Pursuant to Article 7(2)(d) ofthe ICC Statute: 
'Deportation or forcible transfer of population' means forced 
displacement of the persons concemed by expulsion or other 
coercive acts from the area in which they are lawfully present, 
without grounds permitted under intemational law. 
The Elements of Crimes has kept the definition of the actus reus 
reached by the ICTY, modifying only the intent element. The ICTY 
6
° Krstic, Trial Judgment, para. 521.
61 
Krnojelac, Trial Judgment, para. 474. 
62 
Simic et al., Trial Judgment, para. 122. 
63 The displacement of persons is only illegal where it is forced, i.e. not voluntary,
and "when it occurs without grounds permitted under intemational law". In other words, 
displacement motivated by an individual's own genuine wish to leave an area is lawful. 
Naletilic and Martinovic, Trial Judgment, para. 519; Krstic, Trial Judgment, paras. 523-
528; Krnojelac, Trial Judgment, para. 475. 
64 The ICTY has interpreted broadly the requirement that the displacement be
forced or forcible. The term 'forced' is not limited to physical force; it may also include 
the "threat of force or coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, 
psychological oppression or abuse of power against such person or persons or another 
person, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment". The essential element is that 
the displacement be involuntary in nature, that "the relevant persons had no real choice". 
In other words, a civilian is involuntarily displaced if he is "not faced with a genuine 
choice as to whether to leave or to remain in the area". An apparent consertt induced by 
force or threat of force should not be considered to be real consent. Krnojelac, Trial 
Judgment, para. 475; Krstic, Trial Judgment, paras. 147, 529-530; Naletilic and 
Martinovic, Trial Judgment, para. 519; Krnojelac, 17 September 2003, Appeal Judgment, 
paras. 229, 233; Simic et al., Trial Judgment, para. 125. 
65 
Simic et al., Trial Judgment, para. 124. 
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requires not only the awareness of the conduct, but also the intention of 
the displacement being permanent.66 However, the Elements of Crimes 
only requires that the perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances 
that established the lawfulness of such person or persons' presence in the 
area from which they were so deported or transferred. 
67
5. Imprisonment or Other Severe Deprivation of Physical Liberty
Imprisonment as a crime against humanity was first ruled by Control 
Council Law No. 10. However, "other severe deprivation of physical 
liberty" is an innovation introduced by the ICC Statute. Hence, the ICTY 
and the ICTR have clarified only the concept of 'imprisonment'. For the 
ICTY: 
the tenn imprisonment in Article 5( e) of the Statute should be 
understood as arbitrary imprisonment, that is to say, the deprivation 
of liberty of the individual without due process of law, as part of a 
widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian 
population ... The Trial Chamber will have to determine the legality 
of imprisonment as well as the procedural safeguards pertaining to 
the subsequent imprisonment of the person or group of persons in 
question, before detennining whether or not they occurred as part of 
a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian 
population. 68 
However, both Tribunals are of the view that any form of 
arbitrary physical deprivation of liberty of an individual may constitute 
imprisonment as long as the other requirements of the crime are 
fulfilled. 69 Deprivation of an individual' s liberty will be arbitrary and, 
therefore, unlawful if no legal basis can be called upon to justify the 
initial deprivation of liberty. If 'national law is relied upon as 
justification, the relevant provisions must not violate intemational law.
70 
66 !bid., para. 134; Brdjanin, Trial Judgment, para. 545.
67 Elements ofCrimes, supra note 10, p. 118.
68 Kordic and Cerkez, Trial Judgment, para. 302.
69 For the ICTY, see Krnojelac, Trial Judgment, paras. 111-114. For the ICTR,
Ntagerura et al., 25 February 2004, Trial Judgment, para. 702. 
70 Intemational instruments use various terms to refer to deprivation of liberty,
including, ínter alía, 'arrest', 'detention' and 'imprisonment'. The Body of Principles for 
the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or lmprisonment, as adopted 
by the General Assembly resolution 43/173 of 9 December 1988, defines these terms in its 
preamble while declaring that the principles enshrined shall apply "for the protection of all 
persons under any form of detention or imprisonment". The W orking Group on Arbitrary 
Detention, established inl991, also points out that deprivation of liberty is referred to by 
different names, including, "apprehension, incarceration, prison, reclusion, custody and 
remand", United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Fact Sheet No 26, 
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In addition, the legal basis for the initial deprivation of liberty must apply 
throughout the period of imprisonment. If at any time the initial legal 
basis ceases to apply, the initially lawful deprivation of liberty may 
become unlawful at that time and be regarded as arbitrary imprisonment. 
Article 7(l)(e) of the ICC Statute expressly specifies that not 
only imprisonment, but other severe deprivation of physical liberty, is 
also a crime against humanity. It also points out that deprivation of 
liberty must be carried out in violation of fundamental rules of 
intemational law. The Elements of Crimes adds, as a third element (mens 
rea), that "the perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that 
established the gravity of the conduct". 71 
6. Torture
Control Council Law No. 10 was the first intemational instrument to 
consider torture as a crime against humanity. Subsequently, this 
prohibition has "evolved into a peremptory norm or jus cogens, that is, a 
norm that enjoys a higher rank in the intemational hierarchy than treaty 
law and even 'ordinary' customary rules".72 
In contemporary intemational law the definition of torture as a 
crime against humanity has undergone an important evolution. At first, 
the intemational Tribunals applied the 1984 Convention against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. 73 
Subsequently, the ICTY held that the Torture Convention is addressed to 
States and seeks to regulate their conduct, and it is only for that purpose 
that it deals with the acts of individuals acting in an official capacity. 
However, "the public official requirement is not a requirement under 
customary intemational law in relation to the criminal responsibility of 
an individual for torture outside of the framework of the Torture 
Convention" .74
Hence, for these Tribunals torture means "the intentional 
infliction, by act or omission, of severe pain or suffering, whether
physical or mental, for an illegal purpose". 7 It is the seriousness of the
Worldng Group on Arbitrary Detention, p. 4. The Commission on Human Rights adopted 
in its resolution 1997/50 the definition "deprivation of liberty imposed arbitrarily" 
(E/CN.4/RES/1997/50), 15 April 1997, para. 15. 
71 
Elements of Crime, supra note 1 O, p. 118. 
72 Furundzija, 10 December 1998, ICTY, Trial Judgment, para. 153.
73 See, for instance, Akayesu, ICTR, Trial Judgment, paras. 593-595.
74 Kunarac et al., Appeal Judgment, paras. 146--148. 
75 For the ICTY see Furundzija, Trial Judgment, para. 162; Celebici, 16
November 1998, Trial Judgment, para. 468; Brdjanin, Trial Judgment, para. 481. For the 
ICTRsee Semanza, Trial Judgment, para. 343. 
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pain or suffering that sets torture apart from other forms of mistreatment. 
Intemational jurisprudence has not specifically set the threshold level of 
suffering or pain required for the crime of torture, and it consequently 
depends on the individual circumstances of each case. 76 The act or 
omission must have occurred for any of the illegal purposes foreseen in 
the Torture Convention (in order to obtain information or a confession, 
or to punish, · intimida te or coerce the victim or a third person, or to 
discriminate, on any ground, against the victim or a third person) or for 
other similar purposes. 77 
The ICC Statute has broadened the concept of 'torture' as a 
crime against humanity even more. Pursuant to its Article 7(2)(e), torture 
means the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering, whether 
physical or mental, upon a person in the custody or under the control of 
the accused; except that torture shall not include pain or suffering arising 
only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions. This definition 
does not require the existence of any illegal purpose. 78 The requirement 
that the victim must be "in the custody or under the control of the 
accused" is an innovation introduced by this Statute. It does not mean 
that the victim must be in prison. It also includes detention or other 
deprivation of physical liberty, even those forms that are not severe, as 
well as other circumstances where the influence on the victim may 
impede the use of his free will. 
7. Rape
The ICC Statute introduces rape, without a definition, among the crimes 
against humanity. 79 The intemational Tribunals have had to define rape, 
76 "In assessing the seriousness of any mistreatment, the objective severity of the 
hann inflicted must be considered, including the nature, purpose and consistency of the 
acts committed. Subjective criteria, such as the physical or mental condition of the victim, 
the effect of the treatment and, in sorne cases, factors such as the victim's age, sex, state of 
health and position of inferiority will also be relevant in assessing the gravity of the hann. 
Pennanent injury is not a requirement for torture; evidence of the suffering need not even 
be visible after the commission of the crime". Celebici, Trial Judgment, paras. 468-469; 
Kvocka et al., 2 November 2001, Trial Judgment, paras. 143-144; Krnojelac, Trial 
Judgment, paras. 182-183; Brdjanin, Trial Judgment, paras. 483-487. 
77 See Kunarac et al., Trial Judgment, para. 497; Krnojelac, Trial Judgment, 
paras. 179, 186. According to both Trial Chambers, "humiliation" is not a purpose of 
torture acknowledged under customary intemational law, which has been stated so by the 
Furundzija and Kvocka et al., Trial Judgments (paras. 162 and 141 respectively). This 
approach has subsequently been confirmed by the Furundzija, 21 July 2000, Appeal 
Judgment, para. 111. See also Naletilic and Martinovic, Trial Judgment, para. 338; 
Semanza, Trial Judgment, para. 343. 
78 Elements of Crimes, supra note 10, p. 119.
79 James McHenry III, 'The Prosecution of Rape under Intemational Law: Justice
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as there is no commonly accepted definition of this term in intemational 
law. The ICTR took the initiative in the Akayesu case, where it 
considered that rape is a form of aggression and that the central elements 
of this crime cannot be captured in a mechanical description of objects 
and body parts. Like the Torture Convention, it is better to focus on the 
conceptual framework of state-sanctioned violence. 
80 
Therefore, rape 
was defined as "a physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed on a 
person under circumstances which are coercive".81 
This was a very broad definition that causes problems of legal 
security. Hence, the ICTY defined rape in a narrower, mechanical 
description of objects and body parts: 
the Trial Chamber finds that the following may be accepted as the 
objective elements of rape: (i) the sexual penetration, however slight: 
(a) of the vagina or anus of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator
or any other object used by the perpetrator; or (b) of the mouth of the
victim by the penis of the perpetrator; (ii) by coercion or force or
threat of force against the victim or a third person. 
82 
The ICTY Appeals Chamber endorsed this definition, while 
concreting its second element: 
where such sexual penetration occurs without the consent of the 
victim. Consent for this purpose must be consent given voluntarily, 
as a result of the victim's free will, assessed in the context of the 
surrounding circumstances. The mens rea is the intention to effect 
this sexual penetration, and the knowledge that it occurs without the 
consent of the victim. 
83 
The different factors which will classify the relevant sexual acts 
as the crime of rape are the following: 
(i) the sexual activity is accompanied by force or threat of force to
the victim or a third party; (ii) the sexual activity is accompanied by
force or a variety of other specified circumstances which made the
victim particularly vulnerable or negated her ability to make an
that is Long Overdue' (2002) 35:4 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law pp. 1269-
1311. 
80 
Akayesu, Trial Judgment, para. 597. The ICTR followed this approach in 
Musema, Trial Judgment, paras. 220-229, and the ICTY in Celebici, Trial Judgment, 
paras. 478-479. 
81 
Akayesu, Trial Judgment, para. 598. 
82 Furundzija, Trial Judgment, para. 185. 
83 
Kunarac et al., Appeal Judgment, para. 127. The ICTR has followed this 
definition since Semanza, Trial Judgment, para. 345. 
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informed refusal; or (iii) the sexual activity occurs without the 
consent of the victim. 84 
This second definition has influenced the Elements of Crimes, 
where the specific elements of the crime of rape are the following: 
1. The perpetrator invaded85 the body of a person by conduct
resulting in penetration, however slight, of any part of the body of
the victim or of the perpetrator with a sexual organ, or of the anal or 
genital opening of the victim with any object or any other part of the 
body.
2. The invasion was committed by force, or by threat of force or
coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention,
psychological oppression or abuse of power, against such person or
another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment, or
the invasion was committed against a person incapable of giving
genuine consent86. 87 
8. Sexual Slavery
The ICC Statute has introduced for the first time different crimes against 
humanity involving sexual violence different from rape. One of them is 
sexual slavery. The Rome Conference considered that sexual slavery is a 
particular form of slavery but, due to its influence in such a personal 
field as sexual freedom, it deserved a special mention as an autonomous 
crime. 
Although sexual slavery is an ancient practice, taking place 
mainly during an armed conflict, none of the intemational Tribunals have 
ever dealt with this specific crime against humanity. This type of conduct 
has actually been present in several Prosecutors' indictments
88 
and even 
in sorne intemational judgments. 89 But it has always been qualified as 
other crimes against humanity (slavery, rape or other inhumane acts). 
In order to be considered as a crime of sexual slavery, the 
conduct shall satisfy all the elements of slavery as a crime against 
humanity. It also needs a sexual element: to limit a person's autonomy, 
her or his freedom of movement or the capacity to take decisions 
84 Kunarac et al., Trial Judgment, para. 442. 
85 "The concept of 'invasion' is intended to be broad enough to be gender­
neutral". 
86 "It is understood that a person may be incapable of giving genuine consent if
affected by natural, induced or age-related incapacity". 
87 Elements ofCrimes, supra note 10, p. 119. 
88 For the ICTY, see for instance the Third Amended Indictment in Stankovic, 8 
December 2003. 
89 For instance, Kunarac et al., Appeal Judgment, para. 132. 
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conceming her or his own sexual activities and other related activities, 
such as forced marriage or other forced sexual practices.90 Accordingly, 
the Elements of Crimes has identified two specific elements for the 
commission of this crime: 
1. The perpetrator exercised any or all of the powers attaching to the
right of ownership over one or more persons, such as by purchasing,
selling, lending or bartering such a person or persons, or by imposing
on them a similar deprivation of liberty.91 
2. The perpetrator caused such person or persons to engage in one or
more acts of a sexual nature.
92 
9. Enforced Prostitution
There is no intemational instrument defining the crime against humanity 
of enforced prostitution.
93 
The ordinary meaning of the term 
'prostitution' relates to any act of a sexual nature offered in order to 
obtain sorne advantage or a reward, while the term 'enforced' means that 
the offer is made without the consent of the victim or under any form of 
coercion or threat of force. 
In most of the cases, this crime is closely linked to the crime of 
sexual slavery, as it implies a degree of control over the person subject to 
forced prostitution that is similar to the exercise of any or all of the 
powers attaching to the right of ownership over one or more persons. 
However, both legal security reasons and the acknowledgement of the 
grievous character of this conduct justify a particular definition of the 
elements of this conduct, often forgotten by intemational treaties, even 
by the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals.94 
Pursuant to the Elements of Crimes, a crime against humanity of 
enforced prostitution will result from the concurrence of the following 
specific elements: 
90 M. Boot et al., 'Article 7. Crimes against Humanity' in O. Triffterer (ed.),
Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Observers' Notes, 
Article by Article (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, 1999), p. 142. 
91 "It is understood that such deprivation of liberty may, in sorne circumstances, 
include exacting forced labour or otherwise reducing a person to a servile status as defined 
in the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and 
Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery of 1956. lt is also understood that the conduct 
described in this element includes trafficking in persons, in particular women and 
children." 
92 
Elements ofCrimes, supra note 10, p. 120.
93 Nora V. Demleitner, 'Forced Prostitution: Naming an intemational offence' 
(1994) 18:1 Fordham International Law Journal pp. 163-197. 
94 Maria Clara Maffei, Tratta, prostituzione forzata e diritto internazionale: 11 
caso delle "donne di conforto" (Giuffre, Milano, 2002), pp. 1-155. 
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l. The perpetrator caused one or more persons to engage in one or
more acts of a sexual nature by force, or by threat of force or
coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention,
psychological oppression or abuse of power, against such person or
persons or another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive
environment or such person's or persons' incapacity to give genuine
consent.
2. The perpetrator or another person obtained or expected to obtain
pecuniary or other advantage in exchange for or in connection with
the acts of a sexual nature.
95 
Therefore, this crime may be the result of a single, isolated 
forced act of sexual nature, as multiple repetitions of such an act are not 
required. 
1 O. F orced Pregnancy 
The crime of forced pregnancy
96 
is the only crime against humanity of a 
sexual character set down by the ICC Statute where the victim must be 
necessarily a woman. Its inclusion among the crimes of sexual violence 
showed the differences on the conception of women' s rights between 
Islamic States, States not allowing for abortion or allowing it in a limited 
number of cases, who argued that not providing women with abortion 
facilities could be understood as a systematic practice of forced 
pregnancy. In order to avoid this opposition, this is the only sexual crime 
defined by the ICC Statute. The last provision of its definition safeguards 
all national laws relating to pregnancy: 
'Forced pregnancy' means the unlawful confinement of a woman 
forcibly made pregnant, with the intent of affecting the ethnic 
composition of any population or carrying out other grave violations 
of intemational law. This definition shall not in any way be 
interpreted as affecting national laws relating to pregnancy.97 
According to this definition, "forced pregnancy" implies the 
commission of two other crimes against humanity. On the one hand, it 
requires "the unlawful confinement of a woman", a practice that may be 
qualified as a crime of imprisonment or other severe deprivation of 
physical liberty. On the other hand, the victim is "a woman forcibly 
95 
Elements ofCrimes, supra note 10, p. 120. 
96 Kristen Boon, 'Rape and Forced Pregnancy under the ICC Statute: Human
Dignity, Autonomy, and Consent' (2001) 32:3 Columbia Human Rights Law Review pp. 
625-673.
97 The Elements of Crimes limits themselves to repeating the wording of Article 
7(2)(±). 
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made pregnant". It implies the commission of at least one crime of rape. 
However, these two elements alone are not sufficient in order to amount 
to a crime against humanity of forced pregnancy, as it additionally 
requires the special intent of affecting the ethnic composition of any 
population or carrying out other grave violations of international law. 
The crime of forced pregnancy will last until the birth takes 
place, although pregnancy <loes not necessarily need to be realized in 
order to establish the crime, if the other requirements were fulfilled. 
11. Enforced Sterilization
Neither the Nuremberg Charter nor Control Council Law No. 10 
regulated the crime against humanity of enforced sterilization. However, 
its precedents can be found in the application of this Law by sorne 
Military Courts, which included this conduct under the crime of other 
inhumane acts.98 This crime was introduced by the ICC Statute. 
The practice of enforced sterilization is also directed against the 
future existence of the civilian population which suffers this attack and it 
is very similar to the practice of imposing measures intended to prevent 
births within a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, that is, a 
conduct criminalised as genocide. 
Pursuant to the Elements of Crimes, the crime against humanity 
of enforced sterilisation has two specific elements: 
1. The perpetrator deprived one or more persons of biological
reproductive capacity.99 
2. The conduct was neither justified by the medica! or hospital
treatment of the person or persons concemed nor carried out with
their genuine consent
100 . 101 
12. Sexual Violence
The crime against humanity of sexual violence has its origins in the 
ICTR and ICTY jurisprudence. It must be remembered that the only 
crime against humanity of sexual character provided for by the ICTR 
Statute is rape, although it also foresees the crime against humanity of 
other inhumane acts. In its very first Judgment, the ICTR held that: 
98 
Judgment of 20 August 1947 in The United States v. Karl Brandt et al. (The 
"Medica! Case''.). 
99 "The deprivation is not intended to include birth-control measures which have a 
non-permanent effect in practice." 
100 "It is understood that 'genuine consent' does not include consent obtained 
through deception." 
101 
Elements of Crimes, supra note 10, p. 121. 
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The Tribunal defines rape as a physical invasion of sexual nature, 
committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive. The 
Tribunal considers sexual violence, which includes rape, as any act 
of a sexual nature which is committed on a person under 
circumstances which are coercive. Sexual violence is not limited to 
physical invasion of the human body and may include acts which do 
not involve penetration or even physical contact. The incident 
described by Witness KK in which the Accused ordered the 
lnterahamwe to undress a student and force her to do gymnastics 
naked in the public courtyard of the bureau communal, in front of a 
crowd, constitutes sexual violence.102 The Tribunal notes in this 
context that coercive circumstances need not be evidenced by a show 
of physical force. Threats, intimidation, extortion and other forms of 
duress which prey on fear or desperation may constitute coercion, 
and coercion may be inherent in certain circumstances, such as 
armed conflict or the military presence of the lnterahamwe among 
refugee Tutsi women at the bureau communal. Sexual violence falls 
within the scope of 'other inhumane acts' ... 'outrages upon personal 
dignity' ... and 'serious bodily or mental harm' .... 
103 
With these precedents, it is not surprising that the ICC Statute 
includes for the first time the crime against humanity of any other form 
of sexual violence of comparable gravity. The Elements of Crimes has 
called it the crime against humanity of sexual violence. 
This is considered as an open crime, expressly intended to 
include "other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity" as 
opposed to those previously described, aimed at future avoidance of 
defencelessness cases due to aberrant acts against human dignity. Thus, 
it is similar to the crime against humanity of other inhumane acts. The 
criminal basis of both crimes is the same: the protection of human 
dignity exceeding the limits of law-maker's imagination. The only 
difference is that this crime is limited to protecting only a fundamental 
aspect ofhuman dignity, that ofthe sexual dignity. 
102 See also Akayesu, Trial Judgment, para. 697. 
103 Ibid., para. 688. The ICTR also qualified as sexual violence included among 
"other inhumane acts" the castration of a killed man and the public exhibition of his 
genitals hung on a spike, as well as "to undress the body of a Tutsi woman, who had just 
been shot dead, to fetch and sharpen a piece of wood, which was inserted into her 
genitalia". Niyitegeka, Trial Judgment, paras. 462-465. Even the ICTY qualified as a war 
crime of cruel treatment to force civilian prisoners to have sexual relations between 
themselves ("Witness H was ordered to lick his naked bottom and G to suck his penis and 
then to bite his testicles") and to make one of them castrate another civilian prisoner ("G 
was then made to lie between the naked Fikret Harambac 's legs and, while the latter 
struggled, hit and bite his genitals. G then bit off one of Fikret Harambac 's testicles"). 
Tadic, Trial Judgment, paras. 206, 726. 
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It is a fully open crime, depending upon criteria such as 'sexual 
violence' or 'comparable gravity'. Due to the open character of its 
definition, the Elements of Crimes pays special attention to the detailed 
description of its constituent elements, without forgetting its residual 
character for sexual crimes. These elements are: 
1. The perpetrator committed an act of a sexual nature against one or
more persons or caused such person or persons to engage in an act of
a sexual nature by force, or by threat of force or coercion, such as
that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological
oppression or abuse of power, against such person or persons or
another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment or
such person's or persons' incapacity to give genuine consent.
2. Such conduct was of a gravity comparable to the other offences in
article 7, paragraph 1 (g), ofthe Statute.
3. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that
established the gravity of the conduct. 104 
13. Persecution
On the crime of persecution, the ICTY has held that "unfortunately, 
although often used, the term has never been clearly defined in 
intemational criminal law nor is persecution known as such in the 
world's major criminal justice systems".
105 
Trying to provide a 
definition, the ICTY declared that persecution means: 
the gross or blatant denial, on discriminatory grounds, of a 
fundamental right, laid down in intemational customary or treaty 
law, reaching the same level of gravity as the other acts prohibited in
Article 5. 106 
In any case, persecution is a form of discrimination on grounds 
of race, religion or political opinion that is intended to be, and results in, 
an infringement of an individual's fundamental rights. This crime 
encompasses a wide variety of acts, including, inter afia, those of a 
physical, economic, or judicial nature that vio late an individual' s basic or 
fundamental rights.
107 
These acts must be evaluated not in isolation but 
in context, by looking at their cumulative effect. 
108
104 Elements ofCrimes, supra note 10, p. 121.
105 
Tadic, Trial Judgment, para. 694; Kupreskic et al., Trial Judgment, para. 589. 
106 
!bid., para. 621. See Jéróme de Hemptinne, 'Controverses relatives a la
définition du crime de persécution' (2003) 53:1 Revue Trimestrielle des Droits de 
l'Homme pp. 15-48. 
107 
Tadic, Trial Judgment, paras. 697, 710. 
108 
Kupresldc et al., Trial Judgment, para. 622. 
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8 
104 
Elements ofCrimes, supra note 10, p. 121. 
105 Tadic, Trial Judgment, para. 694; Kupresldc et al., Trial Judgment, para. 589. 
106 
]bid., para. 621. See Jérome de Hemptinne, 'Controverses relatives a la 
définition du crime de persécution' (2003) 53:l Revue Trimestrielle des Droits de 
l'Homme pp. 15-48. 
107 
Tadic, Trial Judgment, paras. 697, 710. 
108 
Kupresldc et al., Trial Judgment, para. 622. 
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The victim of persecution must be any identifiable group or 
collectivity, as required by Article 7(l)(h) of the ICC Statute, and not a 
single isolated individual discriminated. Nevertheless, a single 
discriminatory act against an individual made in the context of a general 
and systematic attack against a civilian population may qualify as 
persecution. Persecution must be carried out on discriminatory grounds. 
The ICC Statute contains an open list of discriminatory grounds, as 
persecution may result from "political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, 
religious, gender ... or other grounds that are universally recognized as 
impermissible under intemational law". The discriminatory grounds 
should be read independently of each other, as each of them in and of




As regards the conducts that may constitute persecution, the 
ICTY has held that the crime of genocide and war crimes enumerated in 
its Statute, which also fulfil the elements of persecution, including the 
general elements of crimes against humanity, can be encompassed in a 
finding of persecution as a crime against humanity.110 Even the other 
crimes against humanity may also qualify as persecution, if committed 
on discriminatory grounds.
111 
However, the jurisprudence of the ICTY 
thus far appears to have accepted that the crime of persecution can also 
encompass acts not explicitly listed in its Statute, if they reach the same
level of gravity as the other crimes against humanity enumerated in it. 112 
The assertion that the actus reus for persecution requires no link to 
crimes enumerated elsewhere in the Statute is "consonant with 
customary intemational law".
11
3 On the contrary, the ICC Statute has 
restricted this broad definition of persecution to acts perpetrated "in 
connection" with any of the acts enumerated in the same provision as 
constituting crimes against humanity (murder, extermination, 




cnmes, genoc1 e, or aggress1on. 
109 
Tadic, Trial Judgment, para. 713. 
110 lbid., para. 700.
111 
Kupreskic et al., Trial Judgment, paras. 605-607. 
112 
Kordic and Cerkez, Trial Judgment, para. 195; Deronjic, 30 March 2004, Trial 
Judgment, para. 118; Babic, 29 June 2004, Trial Judgment, para. 30. 
113 Kupresldc et al., Trial Judgment, paras. 572, 581; Kordic and Cerkez, Trial
Judgment, paras. 193-194. In Tadic, Trial Judgment, para. 703, the ICTY declared that: 
"in addition to the acts enumerated elsewhere in the Statute persecution may also 
encompass other acts ifthey 'seek to subject individuals or groups of individuals to a kind 
of life in which enjoyment of sorne of their basic rights is repeatedly or constantly 
denied'". 
114 "In short, the Trial Chamber finds that although the Statute of the ICC may be 
indicative of the opinio juris of many States, Article 7(1)(h) is not consonant with 
customary intemational law." Kupreskic et al., Trial Judgment, para. 581. 
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Pursuant to Article 7(2)(g) of the ICC Statute persecution means 
"the intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to 
intemational law by reason of the identity of the group or collectivity". 
The elements required for this crime are: 
l. The perpetrator severely deprived, contrary to intemational law,
one or more persons of fundamental rights.
2. The perpetrator targeted such person or persons by reason of the
identity of a group or collectivity or targeted the group or collectivity
as such.
3. Such targeting was based on political, racial, national, ethnic,
cultural, religious, gender as defined in article 7, paragraph 3, of the
Statute, or other grounds that are universally recognized as
impermissible under intemational law.
4. The conduct was committed in connection with any act referred to
in article 7, paragraph 1, of the Statute or any crime within the
jurisdiction of the Court.115 
14. Eriforced Disappearance of Persons
One of the main innovations introduced by the ICC Statute is the 
consideration of enforced disappearance of persons as a crime against 
humanity.116 In 1974, the Organization of American States began to
condemn this practice, requiring its immediate termination and 
qualifying it, in 1983, as a crime against humanity.117 In 1978, the United 
N ations General Assembly considered this practice to be in 
contravention of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
Intemational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.118 On 18 December 
1992, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 47/133, entitled 
"Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance", where it declared that "the systematic practice of such 
acts is of the nature of a crime against humanity". On 9 June 1994, the 
Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons stated 
that: 
F or the purposes of this Convention, forced disappearance is 
considered to be the act of depriving a person or persons of his or 
115 
Elements ofCrimes, supra note 10, p. 122. 
116 
Olivier de Frouville, 'Les disparitions forcées' in H. Ascensio et al. (eds.), 
Droit international pénal (Pedone, París, 2000), pp. 377-386. 
117 
OAS General Assembly Resolution 666 (XIII-0/83). 
118 
Resolution 33/173, 20 December 1978. See Federico Andreu-Guzmán, 'Le 
Groupe de travail sur les disparitions forcées des Nations Unies' (2002) 84:848 
International Review of the Red Cross pp. 803-818. 
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their freedom, in whatever way, perpetrated by agents of the State or 
by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, 
support, or acquiescence of the State, followed by an absence of 
information or a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom 
or to give information on the whereabouts of that person, thereby 
impeding his or her recourse to the applicable legal remedies and 
procedural guarantees. 
Building on these precedents, the ICC Statute is the first 
intemational treaty including enforced disappearance of persons among 
crimes against humanity, meaning "the arrest, detention or abduction of 
persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State 
or a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge that 
deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts 
of those persons, with the intention of removing them from the 
protection ofthe law for a prolonged period of time". 
that: 
Implementing this definition, the Elements of Crimes requires 
l. The perpetrator:
(a) Arrested, detained,11
9 120 or abducted one or more persons; or
(b) Refused to acknowledge the arrest, detention or abduction, or to 
give information on the fate or whereabouts of such person or
persons.
2. (a) Such arrest, detention or abduction was followed or
accompanied by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of
freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of such
person or persons; or
(b) Such refusal was preceded or accompanied by that deprivation of
freedom.
3. The perpetrator was aware that:
(a) Such arrest, detention or abduction would be followed in the
ordinary course of events by a refusal to acknowledge that
deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or
whereabouts of such person or persons;
121 or
119 "The word 'detained' would include a perpetrator who maintained an existing
detention." 
120 "It is understood that under certain circumstances an arrest or detention may
have been lawful." 
121 "It is understood that, in the case of a perpetrator who maintained an existing
detention, this element would be satisfied if the perpetrator was aware that such a refusal 
had already taken place." 
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(b) Such refusal was preceded or accompanied by that deprivation of
freedom.
4. Such arrest, detention or abduction was carried out by, or with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a political
organization.
5. Such refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to
give information on the fate or whereabouts of such person or
persons was carried out by, or with the authorization or support of,
such State or political organization.
6. The perpetrator intended to remove such person or persons from
the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.122 
15. Apartheid
Since its Resolution 616 (VII) of 5 December 1952, the General 
Assembly considered apartheid in relation to the policy of racial 
segregation implemented by the Government of the Union of South 
Africa, as "inconsistent" with the UN Charter and the Universal 
Declaration ofHuman Rights. However, it was not until Resolution 1598 
(XV) of 13 April 1961, when the General Assembly began to hold that
its "continuance endangers international peace and security". In
Resolution 1761 (XVII) of 6 November 1962, for the first time the
General Assembly requested Member States to take measures, separately
or collectively, in conformity with the Charter, to bring about the
abandonment of the policies of apartheid of the Republic of South
Africa. However, it was not until Resolution 2202 (XXI) of 16 December
1966, when the General Assembly condemned this practice as a crime
against humanity. Later on, the General Assembly adopted the
International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the
Crime of Apartheid on 30 November 1973. Its Article I declares that
apartheid is a crime against humanity and its Article II provides a long
definition of the crime of apartheid.
The ICC Statute is the first Statute of an international Tribunal to 
include the crime against humanity of apartheid. It provides for a more 
accurate definition than the Convention on the Crime of Apartheid, as: 
'The crime of apartheid' means inhumane acts of a character similar 
to those referred to in paragraph 1, committed in the context of an 
institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and domination by 
one racial group over any other racial group or groups and 
committed with the intention of maintaining that regime. 
122 
Elements ofCrimes, supra note 10, pp. 122-123. 
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In order to establish a crime of apartheid, it is required that: 
1. The perpefyator committed an inhumane act against one or more
persons.
2. Such act was an act referred to in article 7, paragraph 1, of the
Statute, or was an act of a character similar to any of those acts. 123 
3. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that
established the character of the act.
4. The conduct was committed in the context of an institutionalized
regime of systematic oppression and domination by one racial group
over any other racial group or groups.
5. The perpetrator intended to maintain such re gime by that
conduct. 124 
16. Other Inhumane Acts
Since the Nuremberg Charter, the category of 'other inhumane acts' has 
been maintained as a useful category for acts not specifically stated but 
which are of comparable gravity. The importance of maintaining such a 
category was elucidated by the Intemational Committee of the Red Cross 
when commenting on inhumane treatment contained in Article 3 of the 
Geneva Conventions: 
It is always dangerous to try to go into too much detail - especially 
in this domain. However much care were taken in establishing a list 
of all the various forms of infliction, one would never be able to 
catch up with the imagination of future torturers who wished to 
satisfy their bestial instincts; and the more specific and complete a 
list tries to be, the more restrictive it becomes. The form of wording 
adopted is flexible and, at the same time, precise.125 
Other inhumane acts include those crimes against humanity that 
are not otherwise specified in the Statutes of intemational tribunals, but 
are ofcomparable seriousness.
126 
The ICC Statute (Article 7(k)) provides 
greater detail than the ICTY and ICTR Statutes as to the meaning of 
other inhumane acts: "other inhumane acts of a similar character 
intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to 
mental or physical health". The ILC commenting on Article 18 of its 
Draft Code of Crimes stated: 
123 "It is understood that 'character' refers to the nature and gravity of the act."
124 Elements ofCrimes, supra note 10, p. 123. 
125 Jean S. Pictet (ed.), The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. Commentary 
(ICRC, Geneva, 1952), p. 54. 
126 
Kayishema and Ruzindana, Trial Judgment, para. 150. 
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The Commission recognized that it was impossible to establish an 
exhaustive list of the inhumane acts which might constitute crimes 
against humanity. It should be noted that the notion of other 
inhumane acts is circumscribed by two requirements. First, this 
category of acts is intended to include only additional acts that are 
similar in gravity to those listed in the preceding subparagraphs. 
Secondly, the act must in fact cause injury to a human being in terms
of physical or mental integrity, health or human dignity. 127 
These will be acts or omissions that deliberately cause serious 
mental or physical suffering or injury or constitute a serious attack on 
human dignity. The Prosecution must prove a nexus between the 
inhumane act and the great suffering or serious injury to mental or 
physical health of the victim. Hence, the acts that rise to the level of 
inhumane acts should be determined on a case-by-case basis.
128 
The ICTY has specified that the assessment of the seriousness of 
an act or omission is, by its very nature, relative. All the factual 
circumstances must be taken into account, including the nature of the act 
or omission, the context in which it occurs, its duration and/or repetition, 
the physical, mental and moral effects of the act on the victim and the 
personal circumstances of the victim, including age, sex and health. The 
suffering inflicted by the act upon the victim does not need to be lasting 
so long as it is real and serious. 129 
The required mens rea is met where the principal offender, at the 
time of the act or omission, had the intention of inflicting serious 
physical or mental suffering or to commit a serious attack on the human 
dignity of the victim, or where he knew that his act or omission was 
likely to cause serious physical or mental �uffering or a serious attack 
upon human dignity and was reckless as to whether such suffering or 
attack would result from his act or omission. 130 
The specific elements required to constitute a crime of other 
inhumane acts are the following: 
1. The perpetrator inflicted great suffering, or serious injury to body
or to mental or physical health, by means of an inhumane act.
127 Elements of Crimes, supra note 10, p. 50, para. 17. 
128 
Kayishema and Ruzindana, Trial Judgment, para. 151. 
129 
Krnojelac, Trial Judgment, para. 131; Blagojevic and Jalde, Trial Judgment, 
para. 627. 
13° For the ICTR see Kayishema and Ruzindana, Trial Judgment, para. 153. For
the ICTY see Aleksovsld, Trial Judgment, para. 56, Krnojelac, Trial Judgment, para. 132. 
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2. Such act was of a character similar to any other act referred to in
article 7, paragraph 1, of the Statute. 131 
3. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that
established the character of the act. 132 
IV. CONCLUSION
Nowadays there is universal recognition of crimes against humanity as 
those serious offences against life and dignity of human persons, as well 
as of the intemational criminal responsibility of their authors. However, 
the definition of these crimes and the concretion of their constituent 
elements have been subject to significant legal evolution, especially 
since 1993. 
The main impetus for this evolution has been the ICTY and 
ICTR jurisprudence, as well as the codifying efforts reflected in the ICC 
Statute and in the Elements of Crimes. As a result, two important 
innovations have been introduced in contemporary intemational law. 
Firstly, the category of offences qualifying as crimes against humanity 
has been extensively broadened. In contemporary intemational law, the 
traditional categories of murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation 
and other inhumane acts are still included among the crimes against 
humanity. But other categories of offences have also been consecrated as 
new crimes against humanity. These new crimes include several 
conducts of sexual violence (rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, 
forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, and any other form of sexual 
violence of comparable gravity), as well as forcible transfer of 
population, imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty, 
torture, enforced disappearance of persons and apartheid. The 
qualification of these offences as new crimes against humanity represents 
the response of intemational criminal law to barbarian acts committed as 
part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian 
population. 
Secondly, there has been an accurate description of the 
constituent elements of all the different crimes against humanity 
previously defined. This codifying effort encompasses not only the 
context and subjective elements of crimes against humanity, but also the 
specific elements of each particular offence. 
These two important innovations are aimed at satisfying the 
legality principle in intemational criminal law. However, it must be 
131 "It is understood that 'character' refers to the nature and gravity ofthe act."
132 Elements ofCrimes, supra note 10, p. 124.
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN lNTERNATIONAL LA W 579 
pointed out that neither the inclusion of new offences as crimes against 
humanity, nor the definition of their constituent elements have been free 
from political pressures. In severa! cases, the constituent elements of 
these crimes are not in harmony with customary intemational law, but 
reflect the political interests supported by States in their codification. 
States are not only interested in strengthening the intemational 
persecution of these offences; in sorne cases, they are also interested in 
limiting their prosecution. 
